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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
Evan B Anderson, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
) Case No. 981674-CA 
(Appellant's Rebuttal Brief 
REBUTTAL BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN REBUTTAL 
Counsel for Appellee and preparer of the Brief of Appellee is a brilliant attorney, 
well versed in the laws and precedent cases in the Great State of Utah. He is experienced 
in his work, he is paid for his work in this matter, he has a tremendous library and all the 
benefits afforded a prosecutor for Washington County and the State of Utah. 
Appellant is not. 
Counsel may be correct in some things in his "Statement of the Case", in that 
Appellant may not have preserved for the Court of Appeals every point and all of the 
record of the case, but Mr. Farraway is not well versed in the facts, nor does he know 
anything about the atmosphere and the mind set of the trial in the court below. Mr. 
Farraway was not there. 
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Appellant needs to point out the errors of fact in Appellee's brief 
1. The Mellens did not purchase any lot from the defendant. 
2. The evidence was not clear. Appellee deliberately confused the issues with 
twisted and irrelevant issues. 
Some witnesses for the state tried to testify that Defendant and his company were 
not licensed on the date of the contract with the Mellens, but Jane Newton, Licensing 
Specialist for the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, also the 
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS, certified over the seal of the Division, that upon searching 
the complete records of Defendant's company, that the company was in fact licensed in 
the General Building, B100 classification, along with 4 specialties. Said license was 
issued on 5-28-96 according to Ms. Newton. (See exhibit 8) She certified that "...I am a 
public officer for the State of Utah by virtue of the Title 58-1 Utah code annotated (1953 
as amended), and that 1 am the legal keeper and custodian of all records pertaining to 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist 
anywhere they would be in my control and possession. This certificate is made for use 
as court evidence or otherwise in compliance with RULE 44(a)...." (emphasis added) 
(See exhibit #8.) 
No jury of reasonable minds would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Ms. Newton was just kidding or that O. J. Peck was better qualified in searching the 
records than Ms. Newton. Exhibit 3, which is the exhibit Appellee wanted the jury and 
this Court to heed, is faulty, and reasonable minds would not have considered the altered 
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document as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant perhaps erred in not objecting 
to the exhibit more than he did at trial in the court below. 
The fact is that O. J. Peck testified that exhibit 3 was expanded because of 
something he did or saw in the data base. (Transcript page 176 lines 9-11.) 
Contrary to Appellee's position, exhibit 3 does not tell the world everything. 
Exhibit 3 was clearly altered by O. J. Peck, and a reasonable jury would have considered 
that fact as a reasonable doubt. 
This Court should consider exhibit 4 as the prime evidence in this case. This 
exhibit is not mentioned by Appellee in its brief, but exhibit 4 is the license prosecution 
says Defendant did not have. Mr. Peck testified as to what exhibit 4 was. It is the license 
sent to Defendant's company for the purpose of displaying to the public what license the 
company held. (Transcript page 174 line 5 and 6) (also see exhibit 4) Exhibit 4 clearly 
shows the world, that Construction and Sales Management was licensed as a general 
contractor on May, 28, 1996. 
A jury of reasonable minds would have harbored a reasonable doubt after carefully 
reviewing exhibit 4, the license Appellant relied on. 
3. Evan Anderson collected all the money set out in exhibits 1&2. 
Counsel for Appellee stated as fact, on page 3 of his brief that "...Evan Anderson, 
collected the entire $136,384.45. That's not true. There was no evidence to that fact 
because it is not true. 
4. Evan Anderson submitted the application for the building permit. 
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Counsel for Appellee stated as fact that Evan Anderson personally for himself 
faxed the application to the building department "..consistent with the materials filed by 
the defendant by fax." (Appellee's brief page 4.) 
State witness, Bill Weaver who received the application testified that he had no 
idea who owned the fax machine. (Transcript page 66, line 5&6) He testified that "It 
could be anybody in this world, Evan", referring to his knowledge as to who submitted 
the application. (Record page 66 lines 23 & 24) He also testified that this job was the 
first wherein he had received an application supposedly from Appellant. How could 
Appellee claim any precedence in concluding it was Appellant who faxed the 
application? See Appellee's brief, page 4, top paragraph. 
Mr. Weaver and Mr. Peck testified that Amelia Anderson signed for and paid for 
the permit. Mr. Weaver testified that Appellant did not look like Amelia Anderson. 
(Transcript page 71, line 1) 
Mr. Peck was asked on cross about a sentence in his report, the last sentence 
wherein he indicated that Amelia Anderson was the "authorized agent". Upon further 
examination he was also asked "Where did you get the words "authorized agent" and his 
answer was "It's whoever obtained or signed for the building permit." 
No jury of reasonable minds would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant applied for or obtained the building permit based on the evidence. 
Mr. Peck testified that he did not understand what a corporation was (Transcript 
page 177 line 20) and Appellant asks this Court to recognize that Defendant was not 
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acting for himself as a natural person, but through the corporation, Construction and Sales 
Management Inc. 
And herein lies probably the second biggest issue in this case. Defendant was 
prosecuted for contracting personally, and not for his company. 
Appellee refers the Court to a contract between Construction and Sales 
Management Inc. (emphasis added). See exhibit 2. The document speaks for itself. It 
originated as a proposal, and turned into a contract with the Mellen's agreement and 
signature. The very heading states in no uncertain terms that the proposal was "From" 
the corporation, and not from Appellant personally. Appellant signed the document 
because all documents for a corporation must be signed by a natural person for the 
corporation. Appellee asks this Court to apply the law pertaining to corporations in this 
matter. 
No jury of reasonable minds would have convicted Appellant of the crime of 
contracting with the Mellens personally on the basis of the evidence. (See exhibit #2) 
5. Spectra Construction. 
Appellant can not understand why Appellee made such a point of presenting 
evidence to the jury about Spectra Construction Company. Mr. Weaver testified that it 
was he that typed up the permit, so it was he that included the name of Spectra 
Construction Company. 
State witness, Charles Moore testified a lot about his multiple companies, all of 
which contained some sort of reference to the word, "Spectra". He testified that 
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Appellant had no ties whatsoever with Spectra Construction Company. 
But Mr. Moore also testified that he personally had the business cards printed that 
announced to the world that Lenard Wright (a qualifier of record for Appellant's 
company. See exhibit 8) was vice president of Spectra Construction and Dev. Company. 
(See exhibit 9) Lenard Wright was a qualifier noted by the CERTIFICATE OF RECORD 
which was prepared by Ms. Newton. ( see exhibit 8) Mr. Wright was specifically the 
qualifier on Appellants company for the B 100 classification, aka General Building 
Contractor, the very license Appellant is to have not held at the time of the alleged 
crimes. 
6. Honorable G. Rand Beacham action to rescind an order to joinder. 
In further rebuttal to Appellee's "Statement of the case" Appellee's brief excuses 
the court below for "rescinding" a previous order joining this case with another, because 
to hold the trials together would have "confused" the jury. State's continual reference to 
Spectra certainly was a confusing issue, and the issue of Spectra was the Appellee's from 
the beginning. Also confusing to the jury was the Appellee's continual and constant 
position that Appellant at all times acted personally and not for Construction and Sales 
Management Inc., when in fact, Appellant at all time disclosed that he represented the 
corporation. See exhibit 1 and 2. 
Appellant is not bound to point to why the jury may have not been of reasonable 
minds, but these were confusing issues, and surely could have been the reason why the 
jury erred. If the Court pleases, Appellant asks the Court to look at the almost 15 pages of 
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transcript where the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, Larry Meyers, for the Appellee, and 
Appellant conversed over the issue of who could legally act for a company. 
There came a time during this conversation that Appellant gave in so the trial 
could move ahead before the time was completely used up, but the transcript of the 
discussion clearly shows that not even the Court below could determine the legal answer 
to the question Appellee never answered for the jury, i.e. what persons can act for the 
corporation. 
Appellant did not make a record, and perhaps lost an opportunity to have the case 
dismissed on the grounds that the law is ambiguous, and is unenforceable. 
REBUTTAL OF APPELLEE'S "ARGUMENTS" 
ISSUE I: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS? 
ANSWER: YES 
Contrary to Counsel for Appellee's argument, in defending the Hornorable G. 
Rand Beacham, the court below did recognize the reasonable doubt needed to dismiss the 
case and to not let it go the jury. (See Transcript page 208, lines3-7) 
Appellant believes he has amply rebutted this issue elsewhere. 
ISSUE II: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DID NOT GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS? 
ANSWER: YES 
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Again Appellant points out that he is not an attorney, and acted in good faith in the 
court below9s expertise, education, and experience in law to see that Appellant's rights 
were protected in regards to Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Appellee claims the "information" sets out in "concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge." and that it may do. But to 
claim that the information "...met the requirement of setting out the nature and cause of 
the offense(s) charged which would enable the defendant to prepare a defense, as 
required by Blubaugh, at 701." is about as valid as saying that a Highway Patrolman has 
done the same simply because he handed a motorist a citation which stated nothing but 
that the motorist had violated the motor vehicle code. 
Contrary to Appellee's brief, the record is full of incidences where Defendant was 
prejudiced by the lack of a true Bill of Particular: 
A. Bill Weaver's insistence that Appellant was the person who submitted 
or made application for the building permit. Appellant was not informed in concise terms 
what he allegedly did to "cause" the offenses simple because of the information. Nor was 
Appellant obligated to prove that he did not submit the application. The Appellee failed 
to provide a reasonable jury with sufficient evidence that Appellee was the person who 
applied for the permit. 
B. O. J. Peck's confusing testimony that Appellant, as an individual, was 
one and the same as Construction and Sales Management Inc., the corporation, was not 
set out in concise terms in the information for Appellant to have knowledge sufficient to 
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prepare his defense. 
C. The entire testimony of Charles Moore, and his claim that Spectra 
Construction Company, was not one and the same as Spectra Construction and Dev. 
Company, and the other word games with his many "Spectra" construction companies 
was likewise not set out in the information. In fact Appellant had every reason to go into 
the second trial without any defense prepared in this regard because at the first trial, the 
court below forbid the parties from bringing up the Spectra issue. 
D. Appellant had no notice that Mr. Mellen would claim that he dealt with 
Evan Anderson personally and not with Construction and Sales Management Inc., 
Appellant's company was not set out in the information. 
Appellee cannot claim that the information which merely copied the statute would 
give Appellant more that a "definition of the offense". The information did not meet the 
requirement the Appellee recognized in his brief by stating, "The information likewise 
met the requirement of setting out the nature and the cause of the offense charged..." Nor 
would the information as written and without a true Bill of Particulars "....enable the 
Defendant to prepare a defense, as required by " 
If Appellee were correct, Rule 4(c) would become mute and no one would merit a 
Bill of Particulars. 
ISSUE III DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN TERMINATING A 
PREVIOUS CONSOLIDATION ORDER? 
ANSWER: YES 
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As to whether or not the trial court erred in terminating a previous consolidation 
order, there can be no question on this matter. The court below violated the law of the 
case. Counsel for Appellee is correct in stating that Appellant did not provide a transcript 
of "the hearing". Counsel for Appellee did not know that there was no hearing because 
he was not there, but the fact is that the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, without a hearing, 
rescinded the previous order of the court for his own convenience. He saw the order, 
which was made at a duly set hearing in the matter before the Honorable James Shumate 
wherein Shumate granted Appellant's motion to joinder the cases, and because Beacham 
had not considered the other case in setting time aside for the trial for both cases, and he 
had scheduled an arraignment hearing for the same day of the trial in this matter, he 
arbitrarily rescinded the previous order. Appellant did however; refer the Court of 
Appeals to the Record, page 47, which is a minute entry "rescinding" the order. 
ISSUE IV: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RELYING ON O. J. PECK 
TO INSTRUCT THE COURT AND JURY? 
ANSWER: YES 
This issue is key to the multiplicity of errors of the court below. Appellant asks 
the Court to take time consider this issue carefully. In Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367,369 
(Utah 1978), as counsel quoted it, the Supreme Court stated, "It is our duty to assume that 
those who administer a statute will do so with reason and common sense, in accordance 
with its language and intent; and further, that if there is a choice as to the matter of it's 
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interpretation and application that should be done in a manner which will make it 
constitutional, as opposed to one which will make it invalid." 
Again, Appellant is not a lawyer, and I'll not attempt to argue the law with the 
Court of Appeals, but I can read. Peck v. Dunn could not be saying that the court must 
rely on an investigator, a paid public servant who writes citations from the executive 
branch of the government, to instruct the Court and the jury as to what the law is in any 
given matter. Constitutional provisions for separations of power would become mute if 
this were the case. 
It is true; administrators may be expected to rely on their own intelligence, their 
ability to read and their own interpretations in doing their job in enforcing the law. But 
to think it is a duty of the Court to forgo their job in interpreting and applying the law, 
deciding what the law is, and mostly of all, instruct the jury, and let an entry level 
investigator instruct the Judge and the jury is unconscionable. Which is what the court 
below did in this case. 
Appellant surely suffers for having to represent himself here, especially in 
retrospect for not having preserved every issue for appeal as well as he ought to have. 
Appellant also in hind sight, should have proven his innocence in this case to the Court 
and the jury even though he is not required to do so by law. But applying Peck v. Dunn 
as quoted, meaning that the court has a "duty", or is required to take Mr. Peck's word for 
it cannot be its meaning. 
First and foremost, Mr. Peck demonstrated anything but "reason and common 
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sense". He knew little to nothing about what a corporation was. This is nowhere 
demonstrated better than in his interpretation of the licensing statute concerning whether 
or not a qualifying individual, which must be a natural person, is licensed or not. 
Appellant does not attempt to submit to the Court of Appeals that Mr. Peck deliberately 
lied, but the mind set was to implicate Appellant on a personal level in order to get the 
conviction. 
Appellant submits that this concept runs throughout the entire case. During cross 
examination, or re-cross, Appellant asked a question about wether or not a qualifier for a 
corporation is licensed personally. Mr. Meyers, attorney representing Appellee at trial, 
objected and argued with the court below and stated, "He is just trying to separate himself 
from the company." (See Transcript, page 188 lines 10 &11) 
That is exactly what a corporation company does! Prosecution made it perfectly 
clear that he knew what he was doing, i.e. trying to confuse the jury and make Evan 
Anderson appear to be acting for himself personally. 
To Appellant's question, "So, I ask you again was Evan Anderson licensed on any 
of these dates?", O. J. Peck, the administrator who is supposed to use "reason and 
common sense" answered, "Yes". (See Transcript page 180 lines 13-15) 
That is an absolute falsehood. Appellant bets his life on that. Any 
knowledgeable person at the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing would 
cringe at the thought. A licensed entity must meet a lot of requirements pertaining to 
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financial fitness, have insurance and meet other requirements. A qualifier is not 
required to do so. 
But in this case, the jury went to the jury room just as confused as the court was as 
to the question of "who could act for the licensed corporation?", whether it be 
Construction and Sales Management Inc., Spectra Construction, or Spectra Construction 
and Dev. Corp., because the court below allowed Appellee to continue to infer that Evan 
Anderson was really acting for himself and not for the corporation (which was licensed). 
That it mattered not who the proposal came from, nor who did the work, Evan 
Anderson is a criminal because O. J. Peck says so and not because that is what the 
law is. 
Appellee's final arguing statement on this issue again attempts to tell this Court 
that the investigators have the authority to interpret the law and enforce it by instructing 
the court. That cannot mean that Appellant does not have constitutional guarantees to 
separation of powers. Or that a person is guilty just because paid staff members clearly 
want Appellant found guilty. 
ISSUE V: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING O. J. PECK TO 
READ TO THE JURY FROM HIS "REPORT"? 
ANSWER: YES 
O. J. Peck did not refresh his memory by referring to his notes. He had no 
recollections except the exact words contained in his "report" which was admittedly 
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prepared only after he spoke to the prosecutor who wanted to prosecute Appellant 9 
months after the fact. 
ISSUE VI: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING APPELLEE TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE ABOUT APPELLANT'S COMPANY'S LICENSE AND 
DIFFERENT DATES THAN ITS LICENSE INDICATED? 
ANSWER: YES 
Appellee states that Appellant "..cites no authority as to why this testimony would 
not be admissible...". Appellant relies on reason and common sense in this regard. 
If O. J. Peck is allowed to testify about information not known to the public, 
possibly not even to the courts, except to rely on a document which he clearly altered or 
caused to be altered, (see exhibit 3) and for his interpretation to convince the Judge (See 
Transcript page 208, lines 3-7), we might as well dismiss all the courts, all die attorneys, 
bailiffs, and clerks, close the courtrooms and let O. J. Peck enforce the laws as Appellee 
suggests. 
This is of course a ridiculous position. 
Defendant/ Appellant submits to the Court of Appeals that the court below9 s 
statement cited above on Page 208 of the transcript is conclusive evidence that there is a 
valid reasonable doubt, and the case should not have gone to the jury. 
The court below was obviously swayed by Mr. Peck's testimony about what the 
law was. In his statement on page 208 of the transcript cited above, Judge Beacham had 
to be so swayed by Peck's interpretation of the law and about when Appellant's company 
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was licensed, because Peck had no direct knowledge of the facts. He testified he knew 
nothing about the case until after the fact. (See Transcript page 139, line 1) 
The theory allowing O. J. Peck's wrongful testimony about what the law was, the 
dates contrary to those on the license and not separating the Appellant from the company 
carried to its logical conclusion would put an end to all corporations, and make all 
employees, agents and representatives liable for all company obligations and regulations. 
That is not common law in Utah. 
ISSUE VII: DID THE JURY ERR IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
ANSWER: YES 
Counsel for Appellee again argues the same point, so Appellant must also argue 
again. On page 16 of Appellee's brief, middle of the last paragraph, counsel states for 
this court, "The evidence also clearly shows that at the time the defendant applied for and 
obtained a building permit he (referring to Appellant as a natural person) was not licensed 
as a general contractor." 
Of course he wasn't. The Appellant acted on behalf of his company, a duly 
authorized corporation in Utah, and licensed by all means known to the public. Only O. 
J. Peck knew that someone in the Division didn't get around to putting the information in 
the "data base" until after he and the Washington County Building officials, and the once 
151517Deputy Washington County Deputy Attorney Larry Meyers got together and 
decided to prosecute the Appellant. 
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That is the fact that was "clear" from the evidence, and if it wasn't for the 
confusing strategy of the prosecution, the lack of knowledge of the licensing laws on the 
part of the court below, and the incompetence of the Defendant's attorney (pun intended), 
the chain of events leading through both trials in the matter, the intimidation Appellant 
felt at the close of the second trial, knowing that the time was once again used up by 
Appellee, a complete surprise of an arraignment calendar scheduled by the court below in 
the middle of the time allotted the Appellant, and the lateness of the day, the jury would 
have taken the time to find a reasonable doubt just like the Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
almost did. 
Reasonable minds who were not confused by the mis-information set out above 
and fed to the jury, ones who were not pressed by the time restrains imposed by the 
Court's actions, ones who had been properly instructed as to the law as written and 
intended by the legislature, and not as interpreted by the executive branch, ones who 
properly understood the concept of "reasonable doubt" and "burden of proof' would have 
most certainly harbored a reasonable doubt, and acquitted Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has said too much, he is too old and too tired to try to come up with a 
conclusion and subject the Honorable Court of Appeals to any more of his amateur 
attempt to defend himself. 
Except to make a plea for this Court to overturn the court below's conviction or at 
least send the case back to the Fifth District for a fair trial. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th, day of July, 1999. 
EVAN B ANDERSON, APPELLANT Pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 19th, day of July, 1999,1 personally caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Rebuttal Brief of Appellant to be sent to Appellee, 
addressed and deposited in the U.S. Mail, addressed as follows first class postage 
prepaid: 
Eric A. Ludlow #5104 
Washington County Attorney 
Larry Meyers # 7255 
Deputy Washington County Atorney 
Eric Peterson 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Wade Farraway #5069 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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